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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) began with 
good intentions. It was first enacted for the purpose of making flood 
insurance reasonably affordable while protecting against losses after 
disasters.1 However, Congress failed to accurately update the 
program in the face of climate change and new coastal development. 
Because of this oversight, the overall risk associated with the 
program outgrew the collection of premiums, which led to an 
enormous debt to be incurred by the federal government.2 Massive 
storms came and went, repeatedly increasing the program’s already 
insurmountable debt.3 Storms notwithstanding, coastal development 
in vulnerable areas continued.4 Eventually, to address this challenge, 
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was passed 
with the general goal of updating flood maps, removing subsidies 
that kept customers at the same price for decades, and increasing 
premiums to accurately reflect current conditions.5 
 Unfortunately, the program failed to make any significant or 
effective changes for many years. Once changes did finally come, 
they led to massive increases in insurance rates and a massive public 
outrage.6 Residents of states like Florida faced the possibility of 
losing their homes because of skyrocketing insurance costs.7 As 
soon as the five-year roll out of the act began, a group of senators 
and representatives from both parties began to try to halt, delay, or 
repeal the act.8 Eventually, delay of the reform was successful, 
                                                 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(6) (2014). 
2. Dominic Spinelli, Reform of the National Flood Insurance Program: Congress Must Act 
Before the Next Natural Disaster, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 430, 441 (2011). 
3. Ledyard King, Rubio says he’ll vote to delay flood insurance hikes, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 
2014, 7:34 AM, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/10/flood-insurance-florida-
rate-hikes/4393799/. 
4. See Christine M. McMillan, Federal Flood Insurance Policy: Making Matters Worse, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 471, 497-98 (2007). 
5. See Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: SmarterSafer.Org and the Biggert-Waters Act of 2012, 
23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 351, 352 (2013). 
6. See infra notes 124-127. 
7. See Letter from Gov. Rick Scott, Florida, to President Barack Obama (Jan. 9, 2014), available 
at http://www.flgov.com/2014/01/09/gov-scott-obama-failing-to-delay-nfip-law 
-that-hurts-floridians-yet-delayed-healthcare-law/. 
8. See Christopher Joyce, Federal Flood Insurance Program Drowning in Debt. Who will pay?, 
NPR (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/01/258706269/federal-flood-insurance-program-
drowning-in-debt-who-will-pay. 
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leading to a return to the former, unsustainable state of the NFIP.9 
However, avoiding this massive problem is not a solution; this 
article proposes several viable alternatives that would alleviate these 
issues and solve the problems of the current NFIP. 
 First, an examination of the history of hurricane flooding in the 
United States and its effects on Florida and other Southeastern states 
is explored, which culminated in the creation of the NFIP. This is 
followed by a summary of the NFIP’s organization and goals, and a 
discussion of the record-breaking storms and ensuing problems that 
necessitated the implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12).  
 Second, a review of Biggert-Waters, its intended effects on 
coastal properties, the overwhelming backlash against BW-12, and 
eventual enactment of the Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA), which repealed many portions 
of BW-12, is presented. 
 Lastly, an analysis of the future of flood insurance regulation, 
taking into account recent climate change reports and their 
projections about storm events is presented and explored.  
Considering climate change effects and the state of the NFIP, 
options for the future of the program are presented. An assessment 
of whether the HFIAA is a proper solution to the NFIP’s various 
problems is proffered, followed by a proposal for a private flood 
insurance market with mandatory participation. Finally, a solution 
is offered in the form of a recommendation that the NFIP be 
repurposed with an emphasis on land use regulation and retreat to 
achieve the goal of preparation for and avoidance of hurricane flood 
losses. 
II. THE FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE FRAMEWORK 
A. The Emergence of the National Flood Insurance Program 
 At 11:00 a.m. on September 6, 1965, the residents of South 
Florida were placed under hurricane warning as Hurricane Betsy 
was steadily making its way through the northern Bahamas.10 After 
plowing through the Bahamas, leaving behind a surprisingly low 
casualty count of only one, the hurricane’s eye made its way to the 
                                                 
9. See Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 
1020 (2014). 
10. Arnold L. Sugg, The Hurricane Season of 1965, 94 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 183, 186 
(1966), available at http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/hurdat/mwr_pdf/1965.pdf. 
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Florida Keys.11 Significant flooding affected the Keys, mainly due 
to the Northerly winds that preceded the storm’s center; several feet 
of water flooded highways and the first floors of many buildings.12 
While Betsy’s forty-mile-wide eye passed over the keys, the bands 
of the 600-miles-wide storm stretched north to Fort Lauderdale.13 
The noticeable damage along the Florida Atlantic Coast included 
considerable flooding of beach roads and low-lying properties in 
Miami, Key Biscayne, and Fort Lauderdale.14 Downtown Fort 
Lauderdale, in particular, was under a foot of water due to a six-foot 
storm surge with some homes on Las Olas Isles submerged during 
the storm.15  
 Completing its course through Florida, Betsy proceeded into 
the Gulf of Mexico, where it sped forward directly towards 
Louisiana.16 When Betsy made landfall in Louisiana at 135 mph,17 
only foundations and debris were left behind.18 Overall, around 
4,800 square miles of Louisiana were flooded.19 The total cost of 
damage caused by Betsy was over $1.4 billion, with over $139 
million in Florida alone.20 Betsy was the first billion-dollar 
hurricane.21 
 The compounded damages from Betsy’s attack on the Gulf 
Region led to an influx of unreasonably high premiums for flood 
insurance from private insurers.22 Because of the unprofitability of 
underwriting flood policies, few insurance companies offered flood 
insurance.23 Therefore, flood victims depended on federal taxpayer-
financed disaster programs, prompting Congress to enact the 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA).24 In defining the 
act’s purposes, Congress found that it was not economical to burden 
                                                 
11. Id. at 186. 
12. Id. 
13. 1965: Hurricane Betsy smashes ashore near New Orleans, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 8, 
2011, http://www.nola.com/175years/index.ssf/2011/12/1965_hurricane_betsy_smashes_a.html. 
14. Sugg, supra note 10, at 187. 
15. THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, supra note 13. 
16. Sugg, supra note 10, at 187. 
17. THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, supra note 13. 
18. Id.  
19. U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT, NEW ORLEANS CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REPORT ON 
HURRICANE BETSY 9 (Sept. 8-11, 1965), available at http://library.water-resources.us/docs/hpdc 
/docs/19651100_Hurricane_Betsy.pdf. 
20. Sugg, supra note 10, at 189. 
21. THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, supra note 13. 
22. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 435. 
23. C.E.R. 1988 v. Aetna, 386 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2004). 
24. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 435. 
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the private insurance market alone in an effort to make reasonable 
and affordable coverage available.25 Congress also recognized that 
annual losses from floods were increasing at an “alarming rate,” and 
noted that the propensity for tragic loss of life and property caused 
by flooding was something the “Nation cannot afford.”26 In 
addressing costly disaster relief benefits, it was noted that most of 
the victims are still not adequately compensated.27 
B. Implementing the NFIP 
 In an effort to address the problem of flood losses and costly 
inadequate relief, Congress declared people already living in flood-
prone areas should have an opportunity to buy insurance and 
adequate limits of coverage as a matter of public policy.28  Adequate 
limits were deemed necessary to indemnify these people for losses 
due to future flood disasters.29 The two main goals of the program 
were to make flood insurance available across the nation through a 
cooperative effort between the federal government and the private 
insurance industry and to provide flexibility.30 A flexible program 
was desired to allow for insurance to provide an effective strategy 
of “pooling risks, minimizing costs, and distributing burdens 
equitably” between those protected by flood insurance and members 
of the general public.31 Thus, it was quite clear from the time of its 
enactment that Congress intended the NFIP to be a program that 
adapted to the nation’s circumstances so that it could remain viable 
and effective. Other enumerated purposes of the NFIA included 
increasing authorized limits of coverage, identifying flood-prone 
areas, requiring state and local participation and adoption of flood-
plain ordinances, and requiring the purchase of flood insurance by 
property owners who have received federal assistance in acquiring 
or improving land in identified flood hazard areas.32 
 The NFIP was initially supervised by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. Upon its establishment in 1979 
to assist in disaster preparation, prevention, response, and recovery, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was tasked 
                                                 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2012). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(1), (a)(5) (2014). 
27. Id.  
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(6). 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(6). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(d). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(d). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 4002 (b). 
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with administering the NFIP.33 FEMA was authorized by Congress 
to prescribe methods for adjusting claims and paying for damages 
to or losses of covered properties.34 As part of its administration of 
the NFIP, FEMA created the Write-Your-Own (WYO) program.35 
The WYO program allows private insurers to issue policies while 
acting as fiscal agents of the United States.36  
 Under the system created by FEMA, NFIP policies may be 
issued by FEMA directly or by a WYO company, with the private 
company selling insurance under its own name with the federal 
government as a guarantor.37 The companies serve as administrators 
of policies, while the government pays out the claims;38 however, 
policies may not be altered without express authorization from 
FEMA.39 Although the private companies that serve as 
intermediaries for WYO policies give the impression that it is 
private insurance, the policies, through their rather involved FEMA 
oversight, remain federal flood insurance policies. The WYO 
program has gained in popularity and, as of 2004, more than 90% of 
NFIP policies were WYO.40 
 The NFIP does condition the issuing of these flood insurance 
policies. Under the NFIP, FEMA must also oversee communities’ 
implementation of flood zone ordinances in order to promote “sound land 
use by minimizing exposure to flood losses.”41 The purposes of the flood 
zone ordinances include limiting development on land exposed to flood 
damage, minimizing flood damage, guiding future construction from 
flood-prone areas, and authorizing ongoing studies of flood hazards to 
provide for a continuing assessment of the flood insurance program and 
evaluation of the program’s impact on land use requirements.42  
 To be eligible for NFIP coverage, structures must be in a community 
that has adopted floodplain management ordinances and must follow 
FEMA’s minimum standards for construction in flood-prone areas.43 
FEMA must approve the building code regulations of the applying 
                                                 
33. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 437. 
34. C.E.R. 1988 v. Aetna, 386 F.3d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).  
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Peal v. N. Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 508, 513 (E.D.N.C. 
2002). 
38. C.E.R. 1988 v. Aetna, 386 F.3d at 267. 
39. Mason v. Witt, 74 F. Supp. 2d 955, 960 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 
40. Id. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 4001. 
43. McMillan, supra note 4, at 481. 
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community.44 In an effort to mitigate damage, the NFIP requires 
construction in one-hundred year floodplains to be elevated higher than 
the highest recorded floodwaters, prohibits development in floodways, and 
specifies construction techniques.45  
 In addition to the mandatory requirements of the NFIP, FEMA 
provides some voluntary options. FEMA has designed a Community 
Rating System that recognizes and encourages community floodplain 
management activities above and beyond FEMA’s requirements with the 
granting of incentives.46 The incentive comes by way of discounts to 
premium rates for actions that reduce flood damage, strengthen and 
support the NFIP’s insurance aspects, and encourage a comprehensive 
approach to floodplain management.47 Despite the regulation of land use 
and the incentives from the Community Rating System, the NFIP’s land 
use framework really only serves as a condition precedent for flood 
insurance coverage.  
 However, the NFIP’s slack is picked up in some areas by the Coastal 
Barrier Resources Act of 1982 (CBRA).48 CBRA serves as a direct 
response to the permitting of coastal development that has resulted in the 
“loss of barrier resources, threats to human life, health, and property, and 
the expenditure of millions of tax dollars each year.”49  The CBRA does 
not explicitly outlaw development in barrier areas, but excludes flood 
coverage under the NFIP and thereby halts development in these sensitive 
coastal areas.50 This statute does not necessarily have an expansive effect 
on the NFIP’s issuing of policies because it is focused solely on 
undeveloped coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and the 
Great Lakes shores, not all flood-prone areas.51 
                                                 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 501. Some examples include elevating the first floor to protect development that 
proceeds in the area. Id. 
46. National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System, FEMA, (Mar. 19, 2014, 1:56 
PM), http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-community-rating-system. 
47. Id. 
48. 16 U.S.C. § 3501 (2014). 
49. Id.  
50. Martin M. Randall, Coastal Development Run Amuck: A Policy of Retreat May Be the Only 
Hope, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 145, 159 (2003). 
51. 16 U.S.C. § 3501 (2014). The act defines “undeveloped coastal barriers” as depositional 
geologic features that are subject to wave, tidal, and wind energies, and protect landward aquatic 
habitats from direct wave attack. § 3501. The definition also includes all associated aquatic habitats. 
§ 3501. 
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C. Big Storms Test the NFIP 
 In August 1992, the NFIP encountered a major test when 
Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida and Louisiana.52 Hurricane 
Andrew destroyed more than twenty five thousand homes, damaged 
one hundred thousand others, killed sixty-five people, and caused 
$41 billion in damage in South Florida alone.53 While greater Miami 
averted major damage, the storm introduced to South Florida 
citizens and governmental officials the potential destruction that a 
storm like Hurricane Andrew could leave in its path.54 Decades of 
minimal hurricanes and tropical storms made Hurricane Andrew a 
wakeup call for South Florida's coastal residents.55 It was estimated 
that major damage to South Florida might have tripled Hurricane 
Andrew's immense cost.56 Hurricane Andrew’s intensity, power, 
and sustained force over land were much greater than calculated.57  
 Hurricane Andrew was the most expensive natural disaster in 
U.S. history for thirteen years.58 While the NFIP somehow managed 
to keep afloat after 1968 and survive Hurricane Andrew, nothing 
could have prepared the program and FEMA for the 2005 hurricane 
season. A few short months after Hurricane Dennis reached the 
Florida panhandle as a Category 3 storm, Tropical Storm Katrina 
became Hurricane Katrina just off the coast of the Miami-
Dade/Broward County line on August 25, 2005.59 Hurricane Katrina 
crossed Florida over the following day, entering the Gulf of Mexico 
and gaining strength to become a Category 5 by August 28.60  
 On August 29, Hurricane Katrina’s center made landfall in 
Louisiana, bringing with it a maximum wind speed that was 
estimated at 125 mph.61 Hurricane Katrina made a second landfall 
near the Mississippi/Louisiana border and led to storm surge 
                                                 
52. John Kostyack, Reforming the National Flood Insurance Program to Confront Global 
Warming and Other Environmental Realities: A Win-Win for People and Wildlife, 40 NO. 2 ABA 
TRENDS 12, 13 (2008). 
53. Id. 
54. Jonathan Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire: Assessing the Constitutionality of Florida's 
Residential Property Insurance Moratorium After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 732 
(1995). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Kostyack, supra note 52, at 13. 
59. Hurricanes in History: Hurricane Katrina 2005, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/#katrina (last modified May 30, 2012). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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flooding of twenty-five to twenty-eight feet above normal tide levels 
along the Mississippi coast and storm surge flooding of ten to twenty 
feet above normal tide levels along the Louisiana coast.62 South 
Florida collected ten to fourteen inches of rain, while the rest of the 
inland track along the Gulf received eight to twelve inches of rain.63 
Hurricane Katrina left behind over $81 billion in damages, making 
it the costliest storm in United States history.64 Additionally, 
Hurricane Katrina’s death toll neared approximately 1,830, making 
it one of the deadliest storms in the nation’s history.65 
 No more than a month later, a Category 3 hurricane named Rita 
made landfall on the Texas/Louisiana border, resulting in 
approximately $11.68 billion in damage and 120 casualties.66 
Hurricane Rita devastated portions of Texas and Louisiana, after 
first impacting the Florida Keys.67 Still, there was more to come, as 
Hurricane Wilma caused $30 billion in damages and 63 casualties 
exactly one month after Hurricane Rita.68 
 However, no matter how fearsome the 2005 hurricane season 
was, coastal residents in the Gulf Region were not frightened away. 
In 2006, speaking to the New York Times, Philip J. Klotzbach, a 
hurricane researcher at Colorado State University, said, “[t]here is 
likely to be an increase in destructiveness from tropical cyclones 
regardless of whether they are getting more intense or not . . . largely 
due to the increase in coastal population and wealth per capita in 
hurricane-prone areas.”69 Professor Klotzbach and other climate 
experts stated that the main hurricane problem facing the United 
States was unabated coastal development in vulnerable places, 
which was supported by a failure to change government policies and 
corporate and individual behavior.70 At the time, Gulf and Atlantic 
coastal construction was still going strong.71  
                                                 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Kimberly E. Smith, The Go Zone Act: An Innovative Mechanism for Promoting Economic 
Recovery for the Gulf Coast, 77 MISS. L.J. 807, 809 (2008). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Hurricanes in History: Hurricane Rita 2005, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/#rita (last modified May 30, 2012). 
68. Smith, supra note 64, at 809. 
69. Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Experts Warn of More Coastal Building, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 
2006. 
70. Id. 
71. An Examination of the Availability and Affordability of Property and Casualty Insurance in 
the Gulf Coast and Other Coastal Regions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
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 Coastal population growth is expected to continue, with three-
quarters of the U.S. population expected by some to live within fifty 
miles of a tidal or Great Lakes shoreline.72 Worse still, it was 
projected that the nineteen hurricane-exposed states would be home 
to more than half of the U.S. population growth between 2000 and 
2030.73 There are many reasons why people choose to take up 
residence near the coasts. Historically, this development had to do 
with water-based transportation and commercial endeavors.74 
Currently, the popularity of coastal development has some 
economic reasoning, but the benefits are primarily aesthetic.75 
Development near the coasts is not a new trend by any means, and 
its dangers are not a surprise, but the choice to continue to move into 
flood-prone areas despite the continued risk of intense storm events 
does cause a rise in flood risks in these areas.76  
 There was no relief in sight for those who opted to develop in 
those vulnerable coastal locations.77 The year of 2008 brought 
Tropical Storm Fay, Hurricane Gustave, and Hurricane Ike, which, 
along with the rest of the fifteen storms that season, caused an 
aggregate amount of $54 billion of damages and at least $10.6 
billion in losses for the insurance industry.78 The damage directly 
affected Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas.79 
 These storms helped to expose the various problems with the 
NFIP. Many financial problems were present, which stemmed 
primarily from the subsidies provided to properties that suffered 
repetitive losses, as well as the many grandfathered properties in 
existence, whose premiums did not accurately reflect the true risk.80 
These financial concerns led the U.S. General Accounting Office to 
determine that the National Flood Insurance Program was not 
actuarially sound.81 An insurance program deemed to be actuarially 
unsound suggests that the premiums collected for the policies are 
insufficient to serve as a reserve for paying out potential catastrophic 
                                                 
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (1997) (Statement of Robert Hartwig, President and Chief Economist of 
Insurance Information Institute). 
72. McMillan, supra note 4, at 497-98. 
73. Hartwig, supra note 71. 
74. McMillan, supra note 4, at 497-98. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 439. 
78. Id. at 439-440. 
79. Id. at 439. 
80. Id. at. 440. 
81. Randall, supra note 50, at 153. 
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losses.82 The unsound actuarial practices of the program are 
evidenced by the fact that the program has suffered net annual losses 
as high as $600 million.83 In addition to the NFIP’s financial 
problems, participation was shown to be an issue after the 2005 
Hurricane Season. It became evident that homeowners in certain 
high risk areas were failing to comply with the mandatory coverage 
requirements.84 
 Furthermore, FEMA has failed to accurately predict which 
communities are more flood-prone than others.85 This has much to 
do with another significant problem exposed by Hurricane Katrina: 
inaccurate and out of date flood maps.86 Without updated maps, 
residents are unable to base their decisions to build or not build in 
certain areas on the flood risk, in turn making many policies 
actuarially unsound.87 While it is expected that flood maps will be 
updated every three to five years under the NFIP, some maps in the 
Gulf Coast were nearly twenty years out of date when Hurricane 
Katrina struck.88 This twenty-year period without an update is 
significant, considering the fact that during that time, roads, homes, 
and businesses were constructed that served to alter the coastal 
landscape.89 Coastal development such as this can lead to higher 
floodwaters that extend farther than the maps depict.90 With all of 
these problems exposed, it quickly became clear to lawmakers that 
the time had come for drastic reform to the NFIP. 
III. THE BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012 
A. Introducing Reform to the NFIP 
 [T]he National Flood Insurance Program was not intended to be 
a static, never-changing concept; instead, as is apparent from 42 
U.S.C. § 4001(a)(4), the Program was intended and designed to re-
spond flexibly to the reasonable needs of those for whose protection 
                                                 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 440. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Spinelli, supra note 2, at 445. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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the Program, and the insurance policies issued under it, were ad-
dressed.91 
 It became apparent in the years from 2005 to 2008 that the 
circumstances encountered in many coastal areas now required the 
NFIP to show its true flexibility. The residents of coastal areas 
desperately needed protection from the program. Thus, in 2012, 
Congress passed and President Obama signed the Biggert-Waters 
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12).92 BW-12, which 
extended the NFIP for five years, required changes to flood 
insurance, flood hazard mapping, grants, and the management of 
floodplains.93 
 Congress had several reasons for reforming the NFIP. First and 
foremost, the program was in substantial debt leading up to BW-12. 
After 2005, the NFIP borrowed over $17 billion to pay for claims 
stemming just from Hurricane Katrina.94 Hurricane Sandy hit the 
Atlantic Coast in 2012, leaving the program with a debt of $30.4 
billion that had been growing for nearly a decade.95 Thus, since 
2006, the NFIP was considered a “high-risk” governmental program 
by the Government Accountability Office.96 
 Another focus of the congressional reform of the NFIP was its 
lack of actuarial soundness. Increasing this soundness required a 
balance between cost and risk for all policyholders.97 A large 
obstacle that needed to be overcome was the removal of subsidies 
and grandfathered rates, which were originally implemented to 
improve the affordability of high-risk areas.98 By 2012, about 20% 
of all NFIP policies had subsidized rates.99 The main problem with 
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these subsidized rates (known as “pre-FIRM”100 rates) is that they 
do not reflect the actual risk associated with the properties.101 In 
2006, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that only 
about 60% of the premiums needed to achieve actuarial balance 
were collected due to subsidized rates.102 
 The planned implementation of rates under BW-12 is a 25% 
increase per year on pre-FIRM, non-primary residences beginning 
in 2013 until the rate reflects true risk.103 Overall, BW-12 has four 
major elements.104 First, some “non-conforming properties” with 
below-market rates (since their communities first joined the 
program) will have their rates increased.105 In an attempt to reach 
full risk, grandfathered rates will be periodically discontinued.106 
Full risk will be reflected in new policies for any new 
policyholders.107 Second, improved maps will be used to define 
flood rates, incorporating “the best available science,” including 
science related to possible climate change.108 Third, the amount of 
charged premiums will be raised based on these improved 
maps.109 Lastly, the program may begin to implement reinsurance to 
transfer a portion of the nation's flood risk to the private sector.110 
 These drastic changes all intended to secure the stability of the 
NFIP as well as the financial futures of its policyholders. However, 
it soon became evident that this new reform had its own set of issues. 
B. Biggert-Waters Backlash 
 It may have seemed that homeowners and lawmakers were 
desperate for reform to the NFIP and that BW-12 provided the 
much-needed solution. After all, homeowners and lawmakers alike 
in coastal states had suffered through the challenges of massive 
storm and flooding events. Yet, as much as these storms led to 
catastrophic effects on homes in coastal regions, a new catastrophe 
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soon became the focus of residents and politicians: increased 
insurance premiums. This concern was expressed in the following 
open letter to President Obama, penned by Florida Governor, Rick 
Scott. 
Dear Mr. President: 
Your decision to sign the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Re-
form Act of 2012 has had devastating consequences for Florida’s 
families. 
Over the past 35 years, Floridians have paid over $16 billion into 
the National Flood Insurance Program—roughly four times more 
than they have received in payments.  Yet, as a result of Biggert-Wa-
ters, today many Floridians are facing the horror of losing their homes 
due to soaring flood insurance costs. 
.       .       . 
Act now and undo the effects of this mistaken law before it crip-
ples Florida’s real-estate market, harms even more Floridians, and 
reverses our state’s burgeoning economic recovery.  
 
Sincerely, 
Rick Scott 
Governor [of the State of Florida]111 
 In 2013, FEMA began phasing in higher premiums as part of BW-
12.112 These initial increases applied primarily to second homes and 
properties that had been transferred from one owner to another.113 BW-12 
initially had broad and enthusiastic support from liberal environmentalists 
and fiscal conservatives alike.114 Conservatives liked the Act’s plan to 
rapidly curb government spending on flood insurance.115 
Environmentalists liked the inclusion of a reflection of the true cost of 
climate change, which scientists say is “ushering in an era of rising sea 
levels and more damaging extreme weather, including more flooding.”116  
 However, in 2013, coastal homeowners saw new flood insurance 
rates that were as much as ten times higher than before.117 Some premiums 
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increased by thousands of dollars.118 Many of these unexpected rate 
increases were a result of 2012’s Hurricane Sandy. The storm wreaked 
havoc on the northeast United States, especially New York and New 
Jersey, and was consistent with a pattern of climate change producing 
more severe weather.119 Although only a Category 1 storm, Sandy still 
managed to produce around $33 billion worth of damage.120 According to 
certain estimations, had Sandy reached Category 4, she could have caused 
nearly $500 billion worth of damage.121  
 Sandy was a wake-up call to many residents who had been affected 
by the destruction, leaving them to choose between two difficult realities: 
accept a rate increase of up to $30,000 a year, or pay the necessary amount 
to rebuild a home to FEMA’s necessary standards.122 Being confronted 
with this dilemma was shocking to the people of New York, many of 
whom had built their homes well before the first flood maps were drawn 
in 1974 and, thus, had always been protected by subsidized rates.123 No 
longer could these residents rely on comfortably reasonable premiums; 
BW-12 was changing their flood insurance policies in a dramatic way. 
 In response to numerous complaints, Congress called in the director 
of FEMA, Craig Fugate, to demand a stop to the law it had passed just a 
year before.124 Most surprisingly, Representative Maxine Waters of 
California, a sponsor of the original law and one of its namesakes, had 
become one of the most outraged parties.125 She now sought to gut the law 
she had sponsored, which she described as having been “well-meaning,” 
adding, “Never in our wildest dreams did we think the premium increases 
would be what they appear to be today.”126 Rep. Waters told Director 
Fugate at a congressional hearing, "Let me just say, all of the harm that 
has been caused to thousands of people across the country —[who] are 
calling us, [who] are going to lose their homes, [who] are placed in this 
position — is just unconscionable."127 
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C. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 
 In response to the public outcry over increased flood insurance 
premiums, lawmakers began actively working towards a delay of 
BW-12. On January 30, 2014, the Senate passed a bill known as the 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 
(HFIAA).128 Passing by sixty-seven to thirty-two and co-sponsored 
by Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, and Johnny Isakson, 
Republican of Georgia, the bill was to delay rate increases and 
effectively gut BW-12.129 Four-year retention of flood insurance 
subsidies was to halt premium hikes and give FEMA time to conduct 
an affordability study and check the accuracy of its flood maps.130 
Homeowners who were never previously in a high-risk flood zone 
would be grandfathered into lower rates.131 
 Many were in strong opposition to the HFIAA. Because the bill 
aimed to delay most increases for four years (beyond the five-year 
extension the initial act created), budget watchdogs, insurance 
groups and environmentalists argued that the effort to delay BW-12 
“would bankrupt the program and leave coastal property owners 
more vulnerable to future damages, and that taxpayers would be 
forced to pay the bill.”132 Before the Senate passed the bill, the 
White House released a statement saying that gutting BW-12 would 
further erode the financial position of NFIP, reducing the 
government’s ability to distribute future flood claims.133 Senator 
Patrick J. Toomey of Pennsylvania, who alternately proposed an 
amendment to BW-12, criticized the bill passed by the Senate, 
saying, “We go right back to the insolvent, unsustainable program 
we had before.”134 Many of the parties who opposed the bill pointed 
to a recent CBO analysis that suggested that a delay would cost the 
NFIP $2.1 billion in losses over ten years.135 The program is already 
$24 billion in debt.136 
 However, the bill succeeded largely because it garnered 
significant support from both parties in the Senate. Both prominent 
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liberals and conservatives alike supported the bill, such as Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Marco 
Rubio, Republican of Florida.137 Senator Rubio, who said, "I'll vote 
for this bill and I'll support it because it's important to prevent these 
rate increases from going forward, but I would like to find some 
long-term certainty to this," joined fellow Florida Senator Bill 
Nelson, Democrat.138 Senator Nelson’s main focus was on freezing 
the rates before they caused irreversible damage, saying, "It's not 
fair that people are suddenly having to pay 10 times what they were 
just paying."139 Although Senator Nelson found that the bill’s 
delaying provision was a good start, he expressed concern for those 
people trying to buy or sell homes in the areas in Florida determined 
by FEMA to be flood risks.140 A bipartisan agreement similar to that 
of Florida’s senators was presented in Louisiana. Senator Mary 
Landrieu, Democrat, was joined in her support of the delay bill by 
Representative Bill Cassidy, Republican of Baton Rouge, her former 
opponent in the race for Senate.141  
 With general success in the Senate, the next step for the 
proposed delay of BW-12 was a vote from the House of 
Representatives. Originally, House Speaker John Boehner stated 
explicitly that the House was “not going to do that.”142 Although 
Speaker Boehner did not support a repeal of BW-12, he was open to 
alternative ideas to modify the law.143 The issue of the House vote 
initially seemed far from settled. Democratic Senator Charles E. 
Schumer, of New York, stated, “When this bill passes the House, 
millions of homeowners across America will breathe a sigh of 
relief.”144  
 In the end, a slightly different version of the same Act was 
signed by President Obama on March 21, 2014, which was intended 
to delay the implementation of certain provisions of BW-12.145 
Specifically, the HFIAA focuses on lowering certain rate increases 
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and repealing others, refunding excess premiums to some in the 
latter category.146 With limited exceptions, the law guarantees that 
rates will not increase more than 18% annually.147 The new law also 
repeals the portion of BW-12 that eliminated grandfathered rates for 
coverage in certain cases.148 Additionally, HFIAA requires that 
FEMA prepare a draft affordability framework, to be completed 
after the affordability study required by BW-12.149 HFIAA also 
requires that mapping be certified as based on “technically credible” 
data and approaches.150 One controversial feature of the new law 
requires a surcharge from all policyholders to offset the continuing 
existence of subsidies.151 FEMA announced on April 15, 2014, that 
“effective May 1, people who purchased new homes after Biggert-
Waters became law on July 6, 2012, or who didn't have insurance 
before that date, or whose insurance lapsed, will revert back to 
premium schedules in effect Oct. 1, 2013.”152 With that, the months 
of debate over insurance reform and the possibility of solving the 
NFIP’s problems were tossed aside to return to the status quo. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF FLOOD POLICY: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?  
 The NFIP’s problems are not likely to solve themselves, so it is 
essential that changes are made to the program. However, this opens 
the door for many conflicts about which direction reform should 
lead the program, as residents and lawmakers in nearly all coastal 
states, especially Florida, have a stake in the conversation. Several 
factors are relevant in determining what the next step should be for 
this controversial area of law and policy. Section A of Part IV of this 
paper focuses on recent scientific conclusions about climate change 
and recommends that lawmakers rely on these conclusions for wise 
flood insurance decision-making. Section B argues that the 
HFIAA’s stalling of reform is not the proper technique for 
strengthening the flawed flood insurance program because it ignores 
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its continually escalating financial and actuarial problems. Section 
C explores the possibility of abandoning the existing federal 
framework to instead impose a privatized market for flood insurance 
that requires participation by homeowners to relieve the overall 
burden on the risk pool. Lastly, Section D proposes a repurposing of 
the NFIP to focus less on flood insurance and more on coastal 
regulation and retreat, generally avoiding debt from numerous 
massive flood claims altogether. These varied possibilities, if 
properly implemented, could mean more successful preparation for 
extreme storm events. 
A. Reform Must Reflect Current Climate Change Science 
 While the focus of the debate over Biggert-Waters seems to 
revolve primarily around cost, one issue that has been generally 
overlooked is the impact of climate change on the future of flood 
insurance. Several reports and papers have reached many important 
conclusions about the future of climate change, and lawmakers 
should not ignore its effects on tropical cyclones and flooding. The 
primary source of climate change information for the global 
community comes from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which is comprised of several hundred scientists 
who have released five reports since 1998.153 The Panel’s most 
recent 2014 report, preceded by a draft report released in 2013, 
makes clear that there is substantial evidence that climate change 
has affected all continents and oceans.154 2013’s draft report linked 
these effects to human activity, naming it the dominant cause.155 The 
2014 report takes on these climate change impacts as a series of risks 
and points out as gravest the risks to people in low-lying coastal 
areas exposed to storm surges, coastal flooding, and sea-level rise, 
as well as those risks to people living in large urban areas who must 
worry about inland flooding that could wipe out homes and 
                                                 
153. Justin Gillis, Climate Panel Cites Near Certainty on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/science/earth/extremely-likely-that-human-
activity-is-driving-climate-change-panel-finds.html?pagewanted=all.  
154. Suzanne Goldenberg, IPCC report: climate change felt 'on all continents and across the 
oceans', THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 28, 2014, 8:48 AM, http://www.theguardian.com/environme 
nt/2014/mar/28/ipcc-report-climate-change-report-human-natural-systems. 
155. Id. 
128 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 5:1 
 
businesses.156 The report also expresses that some of the effects of 
climate change may be irreversible.157 
 Nearly coinciding with the release of the 2013 ICPP draft report 
was FEMA’s release of a report concerning the impact of climate 
change on the NFIP.  Replete with findings and recommendations, 
the report addressed the expected changes in climate that will affect 
flood insurance policies through the year 2100.158 In reference to 
coastal environments, the report determined that special flood 
hazard areas are projected to increase by about 55% by the year 2100 
if shorelines remain fixed, or by 40% if the shorelines recede.159 
Looking specifically at the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, the average 
growth of flood hazard areas, with fixed shorelines, could be nearer 
to 100% by 2100.160 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) has determined that approximately eight 
million people in the U.S. already live in coastal areas at risk of 
flooding.161 Thus, should the projections of the FEMA report be 
accurate, an immense number of people will likely find themselves 
in flood hazard areas. Additionally, coastal areas are home to many 
of the nation's military, energy, and commercial assets.162 These 
critical areas also will become more susceptible to flooding if the 
FEMA projections are correct. 
 Much of the effect that climate change could have on coastal 
flood zones in the future involves precipitation and storm events 
rather than rising sea levels. The frequency of heavy precipitation 
events in the U.S. is projected to increase.163 Such events are 
expected to occur about every four to fifteen years by 2100, whereas 
currently they occur closer to once every twenty years.164 The 
warming of tropical sea surface temperature will likely lead to an 
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increase in the intensity of Atlantic hurricanes, specifically by an 
increase in hurricane rainfall rates and wind speeds of the strongest 
hurricanes.165 The level of confidence in these various projections 
means that many dramatic changes driven by climate change will 
have severe impacts for coastal areas in states like Florida. What is 
less certain is how much these startling projections will be taken into 
account when reevaluating coastal development regulation and 
flood insurance. 
B. Delaying True Reform: Is HFIAA the Right Move? 
 It is important to determine what the practical effects of delays 
in updating rates and flood maps and making meaningful changes 
might mean for the NFIP. In light of the conclusions presented by 
the IPCC report, it seems clear that storm-related flood events may 
worsen in the future. Yet, the government has chosen to take a 
course that fails to account for any changing circumstances and 
keeps the regulatory framework for flood insurance coverage 
essentially the same as it has been since 1968. The proposed four-
year delay for rate increases and two-year affordability study that 
would be required would extend beyond 2017, the year in which the 
restructuring mandated by BW-12 would have ended. In this amount 
of time, any number of severe tropical cyclones can pummel our 
coastlines and lead the NFIP into greater debt. While the HFIAA 
does not entirely repeal all of BW-12, it essentially removes its teeth 
and fails to give the NFIP a fighting chance to recover. This lack of 
recovery period could be significant for the program that, even six 
years later, is still reeling from the awe-inspiring effects of 
Hurricane Katrina and her cyclonic siblings.  
 An affordability study seems as though it may provide a proper 
reform and address the program’s needs; it should require an 
analysis of private and federal interests to determine what the 
appropriate costs for effectively managing the NFIP would be. John 
Young, President of Jefferson Parish in Louisiana, argued for delay 
by stating that “Congress must consider long-term solutions that 
balance fiscal responsibility with insurance premium 
affordability.”166 Therefore, at a glance, the HFIAA’s proposed 
delay and affordability study could be the correct choice for the 
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NFIP and FEMA. In the short term, homeowners gain some relief 
and peace of mind in knowing that flood insurance premiums will 
not skyrocket for at least four years. In the long term, policyholders, 
as well as policymakers, can rest assured that a proper balance will 
be struck, as informed by the mandatory affordability study. In that 
this plan considers both short-term and long-term benefits, it is 
reasonable to believe it will be successful. However, it is the period 
of time that bridges the short term to the long term that will prove 
problematic.  
 To understand the problem, one need only examine the 
circumstances that led to reform in 2012 in the first place. The 
monumental debt that FEMA and the NFIP acquired was the driving 
force for reform, and to delay that much needed reform would do 
nothing to alleviate that debt. Homeowners will be temporarily 
appeased, but at what cost? The result may very well be a total 
collapse of the NFIP, or simply a later increase of premiums, which 
by then will only be more necessary and more drastic.  
 To argue on behalf of the pocketbooks of the homeowners as 
the important reason for stalling reform of the NFIP is not only one-
sided, but nearsighted. Michael Hecht, president and CEO of 
Greater New Orleans Inc. and the Coalition for Sustainable Flood 
Insurance, appeals to this sentiment by emphasizing that 55% of 
Americans live within fifty miles of the coast, and that, “if the 
Administration wants to address income inequality, it can begin by 
ensuring that millions of Americans do not lose their homes.”167 
This argument is valid, if narrow. Its foundational fault is the fact 
that the NFIP was not created with only homeowners in mind. In 
enacting the NFIA, Congress considered various interests, including 
private homeowners, private insurers, local governments, and the 
national economy. The mandatory affordability study will also take 
into account all of these interests. To let the NFIP’s debt continue to 
escalate while an affordability study determines the inevitable 
conclusion that the necessary reform will, in fact, be costly would 
be to ignore the reasons why the NFIP exists in the first place. 
Unfortunately, the HFIAA is not a solution to the NFIP’s problems; 
it is merely an avoidance of the problems the program is facing. 
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C. Repeal BW-12 and HFIAA; Make Room for Private Insurance  
 Though Congress’s main focus in passing the HFIAA was on 
delaying the effects of BW-12, the idea of more meaningfully 
repealing the act altogether was expressed. Representative Tom 
Marino of Pennsylvania introduced one such bill.168 His proposal 
would fully strike all policy aspects of BW-12, especially essential 
language that leads to rate increases.169 This option gained little 
traction in comparison to other bills proposing to delay BW-12 
(including several which Representative Marino himself has 
supported).170 However, this route leaves room for an interesting 
possibility: if BW-12 were repealed, the next step would be to repeal 
HFIAA right along with it. In this scenario, it may become necessary 
for the NFIP, in its current iteration, to be abandoned or restructured 
from the bottom up due to extreme debt. Thus, new legislation 
would need to be created to solve the problem of flooding in the 
United States. 
 The next step in this scenario may be to return to private 
insurance, just as was standard when the NFIP was first created and 
which was later outlined as a goal for BW-12.171 The purpose of 
such a strategy would be to relieve the U.S. treasury from having to 
pay out massive losses when major storm events occur. While the 
current framework of the NFIP does give some control to private 
insurers through the issuance of WYOs, both the policies and the 
program are still actually governed by FEMA.172 Of course, the 
problem that arises from such a decision is the one that led to 
FEMA’s control of the program in the first place: inability of private 
insurers to sustain the overwhelming cost of the risk of flood 
insurance.173 The NFIP’s significant financial woes are evidence 
enough of the fact that the cost of insuring coastal, flood-prone 
property is a daunting task.174  
 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently 
prepared a report to congressional committees entitled “Flood 
Insurance: Strategies for Increasing Private Sector Involvement” in 
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response to the debate over flood insurance reform.175 The report 
recommended certain strategies that would promote private market 
involvement in flood insurance.176 One condition is for the NFIP to 
charge full-risk rates for flood policies, with only very specific 
scenarios for granting a subsidy, so that private insurers, who cannot 
provide subsidies, would be competitive while offering the same 
full-risk rates.177 Additionally, continued federal involvement 
would be necessary, by way of reinsurance to prepare for 
catastrophic loss or as a residual market for the highest risk 
properties.178 One issue that would require additional creativity 
would be attaining more customers for private market flood 
insurance, as the lack of participation limits the risk pool and makes 
management difficult.179  
 The solution to this participation problem for private insurance 
borrows from another area of insurance: health insurance. Taking a 
page from the Affordable Care Act, a private market of insurers 
could be established for flood insurance with the stipulation that all 
homeowners participate in the market to contribute premiums that 
will allow for the private market to have the ability to handle the risk 
of flood disasters.180 Increasing participation in the flood insurance 
program would enlarge the risk pool and, thus, reduce premiums. 
Additionally, if private market insurance becomes sustainable and 
has successful participation, dependence on FEMA would be 
eliminated, giving the agency an opportunity to refocus towards 
general disaster preparation and recovery. This distancing from 
reliance on complete federal funding would allow for an opportunity 
to recover and begin reducing the massive current debt of the 
NFIP.181  
 The private market for flood insurance is already making strides 
in Florida, where the state Senate unanimously passed a measure 
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that provides homeowners with private alternatives to the NFIP.182  
Florida’s relationship with the NFIP is rather strained, as Florida 
contains 37% of all the NFIP’s policies yet has only received $3.7 
billion of the $50 billion paid out in the history of the program.183 
About 268,500 homeowners in Florida had subsidized policies from 
the NFIP that would have been exposed to significant rate increases 
due to BW-12.184 
 The Florida plan allows for homeowners to purchase less 
coverage than is required by the NFIP, which has limits of $250,000 
for a home and $100,000 for personal property.185 Under the Florida 
measure, a homeowner could choose to insure only her outstanding 
mortgage balance, the home’s replacement cost, or the home’s 
actual cash value.186 While these options for homeowners will likely 
have broad appeal and, thus, increase participation in insurance, they 
do not protect development in flood-prone areas. These 
homeowners will receive what they pay for; in the case of a 
catastrophic flood event, they will only be minimally covered. 
However, in the end, this strategy may support the larger goal of 
rescuing at least a portion of the national economy by avoiding a 
further accumulation of debt due to the NFIP. 
D. Redesigning the NFIP with a Focus on Regulating Coastal Develop-
ment 
 Enacting the HFIAA essentially erased any significant memory 
of the reform that was BW-12. The current solution that Congress 
selected is to delay any true reform of the NFIP for the time being. 
Meanwhile, the other possibility––breaking down the NFIP by 
taking an extreme shift toward private market insurance––would be 
far too complex and problematic. Therefore, the most practical 
solution may be some middle ground where all interests are 
considered. SmarterSafer.org, a group representing environmental, 
taxpayer, insurer, and housing interests, commented on Senate’s 
vote to delay BW-12, stating, “Today’s vote further underscores the 
need to modify, rather than abandon, badly needed reforms to the 
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National Flood Insurance Program.”187 This statement is accurate. If 
one thing has become evident, it is that there needs to be a change 
in the NFIP, or else the outcome may not be agreeable.  
 Luckily, much of what may be necessary to revitalize the NFIP 
is already within the program’s parameters. While the program is 
directly named for its main activity, flood insurance, it also contains 
distinct control over land use and regulation of coastal development. 
One of the NFIP’s main purposes has long been “to encourage state 
and local governments to be more active in regulating the 
development and use of land that is exposed to potential flood 
damage, thereby relieving the federal government of the heavy 
burden of flood disaster relief.”188 The NFIP contains language that 
grants it the power to promote proper land use to avoid flood 
damage.189 Additionally, the Community Rating System provides 
incentive for those homeowners who go above and beyond the 
requirements of FEMA’s regulations.190 Where the NFIP fails to 
enforce land use regulations, the Coastal Barrier Resource Act 
actually steps in to take care of the job, excluding NFIP coverage to 
protect life and property.191 Although land use and mitigation have 
not been the hotly contested topic of flood insurance reform, the 
subjects are certainly relevant. There must be a balanced 
compromise between insurance and land use regulation to create a 
sound coastal flood policy. 
 One solution that would relieve some pressure from of the 
insurance side of the program would be a restructuring of the current 
regulatory framework. One new focus could be construction 
regulation to prevent and correct disaster damage. This solution 
would not look solely to an adjustment of premiums as a solution to 
the NFIP’s debts, which in the past has been a reactive approach to 
managing disaster losses. When a major storm such as Betsy or 
Katrina comes around, the government scrambles to adjust and 
lessen the blow to our regulatory structure. Rather than this 
haphazard remedial approach, proactive implementation of stronger 
land use measures could be the solution the NFIP needs.  
 The CBRA serves as a strong example of what the NFIP could 
do with regard to land use regulation. The act focuses on avoiding 
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damage to coastal areas, particularly barriers, and any ecosystem or 
construction that this protected area entails.192 With this strict goal 
in mind, the act makes it necessary to give a firm “no” to certain 
proposed developments. What the CBRA recognizes is that certain 
coastal harms are inevitable. With support from the IPCC report, one 
can only expect that these harms are here to stay.193  The CBRA 
essentially determines that these coastal regions are not to be 
inhabited due to the loss that will almost surely occur; it would be 
wasteful to continue to allow the same buildings to be erected in 
these areas. The overall message of the CBRA: retreat from the 
coasts. 
 Meanwhile, the NFIP’s main goal has always been to provide 
affordable and accessible flood insurance.194 No matter how 
extreme the storms or the debt, the focus on affordability remained. 
When desperately needed reform finally arrived in the form of BW-
12, homeowners and lawmakers alike scoffed at the idea of having 
to pay more for protection against an inevitable and escalating harm. 
Upon moving to and constructing a home in a flood-prone coastal 
zone, one can generally rely on the certainty that FEMA and the 
NFIP will provide the necessary relief after big, bad storms. The 
overall message is that residents should feel free to move to a flood-
prone area. Also, because of the NFIP’s failure to update premiums, 
the second part of the message is an assurance that residents will be 
charged far less than needed to sustain the program. Regulating 
development is an afterthought for the NFIP because the preference 
is simply to rebuild after a storm, as promised. 
 Proposing an increase in land use and construction regulation 
through the power of the NFIP shifts the strategy of the program to 
one that promotes retreat and thereby avoids and mitigates hurricane 
flood damage to insured properties. In a coastal state like Florida, 
this would mean that residents in hazardous flood zones would lose 
the safety net of flood insurance payouts when a storm hits. It would 
not be long before many residents made the choice to stop rebuilding 
their homes along Florida’s many beaches and began to seek 
landward shelter. This proposition is not without controversy. The 
debate is often politicized, as exemplified by Democratic Gov. 
Andrew Cuomo in New York pushing a retreat approach to relocate 
flood victims, while Republican Gov. Chris Christie in New Jersey 
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“has jumped aboard the bandwagon against the NFIP and against 
FEMA, assailing them at town hall meetings as agents of sloth and 
caution in a moment of urgent citizen need.”195  
 The reason that strict land use regulation is a necessary option 
is because continued funding of flood insurance in high-risk areas is 
a losing game. The solution to the program’s failings was packaged 
nicely in BW-12, but it was rejected. So rather than spending time 
on an affordability study that will only show the obvious conclusion 
that flood insurance is not affordable, the government must commit 
time and energy into repurposing the NFIP as a land use and 
development planning tool for vulnerable coastal areas. The 
program could use its insurance framework to mitigate the effects of 
catastrophic losses when they occur on a massive scale, but for the 
most part the losses should be avoided by proper foresight and 
regulation. 
 Even without retreat, the systems already in place are powerful 
enough to create a solid foundation for sustainable development. 
Even if the NFIP doesn’t last, some of the coastal construction will, 
so long as it is built with scientific advancement in mind, as well as 
the well-known threat of future cyclone events. After many years of 
extending a helping hand to homeowners, with few expectations in 
return, the United States must pull the hand away and lay down some 
strict rules. 
 Though slightly extreme compared to the United States’ flood 
policy approach, the strategy of the Netherlands serves as a 
fascinating case study not of retreat but of preparedness and 
foresight. In a particular Dutch province twelve feet below sea level, 
hydrologists ensure that no event like Hurricane Sandy will ever 
harm their coasts by utilizing an advanced defensive system of flood 
control to block storm surges.196 While the method is highly 
scientific, it is the philosophy towards disaster that is most shocking. 
Rather than focusing on disaster relief and disaster management, 
like the U.S., the focus in the Netherlands is on disaster avoidance 
and anticipating and minimizing the risk of flooding.197 In the 
Netherlands, the focus is planning and design that will benefit all 
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residents, not an endless stream of unsustainable, unaffordable 
insurance coverage. It is time for U.S. flood insurance and disaster 
policy to go Dutch. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The National Flood Insurance Program began with the simple 
intention to help homeowners. Unfortunately, the program’s 
selflessness has led it down a path of instability and dire financial 
straits. Now is the time for the program to propel itself into the future 
as a smarter, more streamlined program that accounts for climate 
change effects, changes in development in coastal zones, true risk, 
available science, and its own massive debts. One thing is certain: 
the NFIP will not last much longer if no action is taken to repair it 
and save it from debt. 
 The options that may save the NFIP are drastic, but they could 
be the catalyst for change in the right direction. Support from a 
private market of insurers, giving much needed relief to the federal 
government, would be welcomed with open arms. Alternatively, a 
repurposing of the program with a focus on land use and 
development regulation could do more than just alter the program’s 
principles, but could actually alter societal attitudes toward disaster 
preparedness and climate change. Better yet, the NFIP could 
combine both recommendations to assure its future strength and 
prosperity. It will take time and much more debate before another 
round of drastic reforms occur, but one can only hope that the 
change arrives before the next big storm does. 
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